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The Michael Jackson of two or three noses ago and the Michael Jackson of today – multiple personalities or conceptual metonymy?

The paper deals with the construction of the figurative meaning of personal names in expressions of the type *the X of Y*, in which *X* is a personal name designating humans and *Y* designates a temporal period. Such expressions, used in connection with the original bearer of the name, are considered to be instances of partitive restrictive modification. Applying the findings of Barcelona (2003, 2004) and Brdar and Brdar-Szabó (2007) concerning the figurative meaning of personal names, the paper illustrates that the ENTITY FOR ACTIVE ZONE metonymy is an essential tool in explaining how the figurative meaning of personal names arises in expressions of this type. As a result of partitive restrictive modification, the original bearer of the personal name is figuratively split into distinct individuals due to the ENTITY FOR ACTIVE ZONE metonymy.

Key words: personal names, figurative meaning, partitive restrictive modification, the ENTITY FOR ACTIVE ZONE metonymy

1. Introduction

Proper names have attracted the attention of linguists and philosophers alike for centuries. There are numerous linguistic and philosophical insights into proper names, each focusing on different aspects. Some of these theories have had wide application and have been of great importance, while others are merely unsuccessful attempts to construct a valid theory of proper nouns. Philosophy of language has produced studies on the reference of proper names: some hold that

proper names do not have semantic value, while some even go so far as to claim that proper names are not part of language (cf. Frege 1952, Searle 1958, Putnam 1975, Kripke 1972/1980).¹ Furthermore, linguistic theories describe, with greater or lesser success, the grammatical makeup and behavior of proper nouns and touch upon their reference. Recent publications on proper nouns (Anderson 2007, Lehrer 1999) confirm that proper nouns remain an interesting and perennial topic in linguistic research.

Unlike the aforementioned philosophical studies, cognitive linguists (cf. Cruse 2000, Barcelona 2003, 2004) have arrived at the conclusion that proper nouns do have both a meaning and a reference. Furthermore, a number of recent studies written within the framework of cognitive linguistics (Barcelona 2003, 2004, Brdar and Brdar-Szabó 2007, Brdar 2007) focus on the figurative meaning of proper nouns as accompanied by their irregular morpho-syntactic behavior. The findings of these papers show that cognitive linguistics, with its theory of metaphor and metonymy, is able to shed light on the figurative use of proper names, and indeed offers precisely the explanation lacking in classical theories of proper names.

This paper follows in the footsteps of Barcelona (2003, 2004) and Brdar and Brdar-Szabó (2007) in exploring proper names. Specifically, it deals with expressions of the type *the X of Y*, in which *X* is a personal name and *Y* designates temporal periods. Such expressions are used in connection with the original bearer of the name and are regarded as instances of partitive restrictive modification. The paper is an extension of the work of Barcelona and Brdar and Brdar-Szabó in that it considers the conceptual metonymy ENTITY FOR ACTIVE ZONE essential in explaining how the figurative meaning of personal names arises in expressions of this type.

The first part of the paper presents cases of irregular behavior of personal names, providing examples and discussing the consequences of such irregular behavior. The second part focuses on the construction of the figurative meaning of personal names in expressions of the type *the X_{personal name} of Y* in which *Y* designates a temporal period and the original bearer of the personal name is figuratively split into distinct individuals due to the ENTITY FOR ACTIVE ZONE metonymy. Finally, the paper presents general conclusions drawn from the analysis and prospects for further research.

¹ For a summary of basic ideas behind the direct-reference doctrine and the reference-via-meaning doctrine cf. Machery et al. (2004). For criticism of the direct-reference doctrine and the reference-via-meaning doctrine cf. Lakoff (1987: 162ff), Lakoff and Johnson (1999: 98ff), Cruse (2000: 315-318), Brdar and Brdar-Szabó (2007: 127-129)

2. On irregular morpho-syntactic behavior of personal names

In their chapters devoted to nouns, descriptive grammars (Quirk et al. 1985: 288-297, Greenbaum and Quirk 1990: 86-88, Biber et al. 1999: 245-247) state that the principal difference between common nouns and proper nouns resides in the lack of determination, number contrast and modification. Furthermore, proper nouns exhibit more restricted morpho-syntactic features than do common nouns, due to their unique denotation. In cognitive grammar terms (Langacker 1991: 59), the difference between common and proper nouns is that the semantic functions of proper nouns, i.e. type, instantiation, quantity, and grounding, are fused together in a single expression. Langacker (1991: 101f) points out that a personal name “incorporates the idealized cognitive model which specifies that it is borne by, and suffices to identify, just one individual”.

However, descriptive grammars also provide exceptions to the rules mentioned above and discuss circumstances under which proper nouns can appear with determiners, besides being modified and marked for number. In examples (1)-(3), retrieved from Google, personal names exhibit such irregular morpho-syntactic behavior. In (1) a. and b. personal names appear with indefinite articles; in (2) a personal name is accompanied by the definite article and pluralized; in (3) personal names are nonrestrictively premodified; in (4) a.-c. personal names are restrictively postmodified and, in addition, (4) b. and c. can be treated as instances of partitive restrictive modification.

- (1) a. Every time a Maltese is seen on the celebrity arm of *an Elizabeth Taylor, a Wayne Newton* or *a Halle Berry*, the perception of the Maltese as a pristine white lounge ornament is advanced.
- b. Hezbollah’s defenders continue to paint its leader, Hassan Nasrallah, as *an Arafat*, not *a bin Laden*.
- (2) I guarantee you that the ones with staying power, *the Julia Roberts, the Brad Pitts*, they all have talent, in some manner, and then they have this other energy. I don’t know what it is, but I ain’t got it.
- (3) I love *the beautiful Angelina Jolie* and *the handsome Brad Pitt*.
- (4) a. “This isn’t just a rare bird, this is *the Brad Pitt of birds*, one everyone wants to see,” Stiteler said. “Then imagine *5,000 or more Brad Pitts* in one area in one winter. Most of us are happy if we see one or two in a year. But to see 10 or 20 or more in one day...you can imagine how bird people got a little excited.”

- b. I'm sure there's a difference between *the Julia Roberts who eats pizza* and *the Julia Roberts you read about in the tabloids*. Writing about celebrity is a way of crystallizing those issues.
- c. America's early assessment of bin Laden was similarly flawed. In the American mind, of course, *the bin Laden of April, 1998*, was not *the bin Laden of September, 2001*. But his intentions were no secret. Two months before the Richardson meeting, bin Laden had issued a fatwa, a religious ruling, in which he called on Muslims to kill Americans—civilians and military.

The irregular morpho-syntactic behavior of proper nouns has important consequences for their grammatical status and semantic value. According to the standard grammars mentioned above, a consequence of irregular behavior of proper nouns is the reclassification of proper nouns as common nouns. Proper nouns exhibiting such unusual behavior no longer have unique denotation. In view of cognitive grammar, Langacker (1991: 59f) points out that, in certain cases, which are in contradiction with the idealized cognitive model, the idealized cognitive model is suspended and a proper noun behaves as a common noun, permitting determination and modification, and showing number contrast. This further implies that the type/instance distinction, which is neutralized with proper names, applies when a proper name is treated as a common noun. Langacker (1991: 59) concludes that a proper name “acts as a common noun grammatically because it is so treated semantically, i.e. the grammatical behavior is symptomatic of its meaning”.

Another consequence of such behavior of proper nouns - the consequence that this paper focuses on - is that such proper names have figurative meaning. Cognitive linguists (Radden and Kövecses 1999, Barcelona 2003, 2004, Brdar and Brdar-Szabó 2007, Brdar 2007) believe that cognitive mechanisms, namely metaphor and metonymy, are involved in the construction of the figurative meaning of proper nouns. Radden and Kövecses (1999: 35) briefly mention the use of a WHOLE FOR PART metonymy, namely CATEGORY FOR DEFINING PROPERTY, though which a category stands for a stereotypical property of an individual and the name acquires a figurative meaning. However, such an approach may seem oversimplified in comparison to the complementary models proposed by Barcelona, and Brdar and Brdar-Szabo. Barcelona (2003, 2004) discusses at length the irregular behavior of proper nouns and the construction of the figurative meaning from the stand point of conceptual metonymy and Lakoff's (1987) metonymic models, namely stereotypes and paragon. Barcelona (2004: 364) further argues that the use of a proper name as a common noun can be explained by three conceptual factors, namely the stereotypical model, “the mental crea-

tion of a class of individuals characterized by one or more of the relations and properties imported from conceptual model (a) [stereotypical model]” and metonymy which links the source domain, the stereotypical model, to the target domain, the class of talented individuals, whose member is the bearer of the name. Brdar and Brdar-Szabó (2007) devote an entire section to this issue and regard tiers of metonymic and metaphoric mappings as vital processes in the construction of the figurative meaning of proper names. Depending on the type of expressions, the meaning is constructed in tiers of metonymic mappings, ranging from one to four, which can be followed by an additional tier of metaphoric mappings. In addition, Barcelona (2003) and Brdar and Brdar-Szabó (2007) also address the issue of partitive restrictive modification, exemplified in (4) b. and c. Their findings have laid the foundations for the present paper.

3. The role of the ENTITY FOR ACTIVE ZONE metonymy in conceptual partition of a unitary entity

Presented in (5) are expressions of the type *the X_{personal name} of Y*, in which *Y* designates temporal periods and the personal name Zinedine Zidane is used figuratively in connection with Zinedine Zidane himself. In examples (5) a.-d., it seems that *the Zidane of 2006*, *the Zidane of 1998*, and *the Zidane of 2002* are not the same person, but rather distinct individuals.

- (5) a. Persuaded to come out of retirement to help France’s flagging qualification, *the Zidane of 2006* is the mere ghost of *the once great Zizou, scorer of two goals in the 1998 final*.
- b. "Zizou" may not be able to last 90 minutes, but he was the catalyst for five dangerous moves until he fizzled out after about an hour. Although his legs tired, his body language resembled *the Zidane of '98 and Euro 2000*.
- c. He was not *the Zidane of 1998*, when he used his head so splendidly to score twice to lead France to victory in the final against Brazil in Paris. Eight years on, too much was asked of Zidane. It was a sad end to arguably the finest career of his era when he head-butted the Italian Marco Materazzi in the chest, apparently in pique because the Italian had insulted Zidane’s sister.
- d. *The Zidane of 2002* is a man sure of both his talent and his limits, knowing how to make the most of his art. He works for the

team but, with his 30th birthday approaching on June 23, has added that touch of selfishness long lacking in his game.

The *of* phrase modification in these expressions can be understood as an instance of partitive restrictive modification. Quirk et al. (1985: 290) point out that in partitive restrictive modification “cataphoric *the* with restrictive modification can have the effect of splitting up the unique referent of the proper noun into different parts or aspects”. Based on this definition, Barcelona (2003: 26) explains partitive restrictive modification as follows.

In partitive restrictive modification, the referent of the noun phrase headed by the name, which is regularly construed as a unitary entity, is figuratively “split up” (hence the term ‘partitive’) and re-categorized as a class of entities, and then the restrictive modifier narrows down the referential scope of that NP to just one member or a subset of the figurative class.

The effect produced by partitive restrictive modification is to take the unitary referent of a personal name, existing in the realm of reality, and figuratively split it into distinct individuals. According to Barcelona (2003: 26-29), the creation of this counterfactual class of distinct individuals is achieved metonymically, via a WHOLE FOR PART conceptual metonymy, namely ENTITY FOR ACTIVE ZONE. Barcelona’s approach to conceptual partition is very useful for analyzing the previous examples.

Unlike Barcelona (2003), who mentions the ENTITY FOR ACTIVE ZONE metonymy only in relation to partitive restrictive modification, Brdar and Brdar-Szabó (2007) use the ENTITY FOR ACTIVE ZONE metonymy in all of their examples when analyzing the construction of the figurative meaning of personal names. According to Brdar and Brdar-Szabó (2007: 132), the construction of the figurative meaning of proper names starts with the primary domain, or domain matrix in which one’s encyclopedic knowledge of the bearer of the name is organized. Therefore, in the examples in (5), the construction of the figurative meaning of the personal name Zidane starts with the intersection of two domains, namely the Zidane domain and the football domain. The Zidane domain comprises the complete encyclopedic knowledge of Zidane one can possess. Since common knowledge of the life and career of Zidane mostly, if not solely, encompasses knowledge of Zidane as a football player, the Zidane domain must be considered in combination with the football domain. The Zidane domain, therefore, intersects with the football domain, which includes one’s encyclopedic knowledge of football as a sport. The intersection of these two domains produces ‘Zidane the footballer’. The cognitive mechanism involved in the construction of the figurative meaning is a WHOLE-FOR-PART metonymy, namely the ENTITY FOR ACTIVE ZONE metonymy in which the personal name Zidane is the vehicle and ‘Zidane

the footballer' is the target. According to Brdar and Brdar-Szabó (2007: 135), this metonymy is the basis for all other potential tiers of metonymic and metaphoric mappings.

However, in the construction of the figurative meaning of the proper names in (5), the active zone is not the whole intersection of the Zidane domain and the football domain. Rather, the active zones are only certain aspects of 'Zidane the footballer' which are connected to particular periods of Zidane's career. As Brdar and Brdar-Szabó (2007: 140) claim, "... time is not a distinct domain in such cases but a dimension inherent" in the Zidane domain. The *of* phrase designating time indicates that the conceptual partition of a holistic entity, i.e. Zidane, is achieved by metonymically focusing on different aspects along the time axis, "which can be projected beyond the present time as well, i.e. into the as yet virtual section of the future" (Brdar and Brdar-Szabó 2007: 140).²

The diagram below presents the conceptual partition of a unitary entity along the time axis. As the diagram shows, the intersection of the Zidane domain and the football domain produces 'Zidane the footballer'. On the time axis cutting across the two domains, the periods of time which are perceived as important points in Zidane's career are isolated. As the diagram further illustrates, the time axis stretches from the beginning of Zidane's life and into the future. The active zone is a period in Zidane's career characterized by an outstanding performance in the 1998 World Cup, often regarded as the highlight of his career. The vehicle of the ENTITY FOR ACTIVE ZONE metonymy is the personal name Zidane, while the target is the Zidane of 1998. The arrow indicating metonymic mappings is placed in the opposite direction, pointing from the target to the vehicle, as in models by Barcelona (2003, 2004) and Brdar and Brdar-Szabó (2007). The direction of the arrow indicates that the active zone becomes "so prominent as to overwrite the whole structure of the original knowledge base (be it a domain or matrix)." (Brdar and Brdar-Szabó 2007: 132)

² Note that Barcelona (2003: 26-29), in the analysis of his examples, regards the domain of AGE as a subdomain of the domain of the bearer of the personal name. Furthermore, Barcelona (2003: 27) states that "[a]n inherent component of the domain of AGE is a measurement scale with several discrete points (the various age phases in life)."




Figure 1. Conceptual partition of a unitary entity 'Zidane' along the time axis.

In the examples above *the Zidane of 1998*, *the Zidane of 2002*, and *the Zidane of 2006* are treated as members of a counterfactual group of distinct individuals due to a conceptual partition via the ENTITY FOR ACTIVE ZONE metonymy. Assuming that a person changes in certain respects and to some extent as time passes, the temporal periods mentioned in the *of* phrase represent different stages in the life of a person, in this case Zidane. For each temporal period marked in Zidane's life, certain characteristic properties of the Zidane of that period can be isolated. Conceptual partition along the time axis isolates periods in Zidane's life during which his characteristic properties were distinct enough to be considered as belonging to different individuals. The conceptual partition of this sort can be only achieved by comparing and contrasting different properties viewed at different stages of the individual's life. The diagram below shows different stages in Zidane's football career and the defining properties of each temporal period.




Figure 2. A fragment of the figurative counterfactual class of ZIDANES along the time axis.

In example (5) a., Zidane's performance in the 2006 World Cup is considered not nearly as good as his performance during the 1998 World Cup. As this example illustrates, the *of* phrase postmodification is not the only means of achieving conceptual partition. In this example, the expression *the once great Zizou, scorer of two goals in the 1998 final* is an instance of conceptual partition by restrictive premodification. However, it must be noted that another expression helps in conceptual partition, i.e. the noun phrase in apposition, *scorer of two goals in the 1998 final*, itself containing restrictive postmodification. In example (5) b. the Zidane of the present is compared with *the Zidane of '98 and Euro 2000*, when his football career was at its peak. It is interesting that the *of* phrase in the expression *the Zidane of '98 and Euro 2000* contains two noun phrases, one referring to a temporal period, 1998, and the other to a tournament, Euro 2000. It can be assumed that the event, Euro 2000, metonymically stands for the time period, 2000, via the EVENT FOR TIME metonymy.³

³ This metonymy is not unusual. Events can stand for temporal periods, just as temporal periods can stand for events. Lakoff and Johnson (1999: 154) illustrate this metonymy with the sentence *The Kronos Quartet Concert is approaching*. In this sentence, the event of the concert stands for the time of the concert. Similarly, in expressions such as *during World War II* or *during the Vietnam war*, the events, World War II and the Vietnam War metonymically stand for the temporal periods, 1939-1945 and 1959-1975, respectively. Furthermore, in today's omnipresent expression, *September 11*, time metonymically stands for an event, the attacks on the World Trade Center, via the EVENT FOR TIME metonymy.

In (6) a.-c., Saddam Hussein is the personal name used in expressions of the type *the X_{personal name} of Y*.

- (6) a. *The Saddam of 1968-80*, or as some called him back then “*the Atatürk of modern Iraq*”, was certainly better than *the ruthless dictator who emerged after the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-88*. That Saddam, after all, was a ruthless leader.
- b. *The Saddam of December 30, 2006* was different from *the one of September 22, 1980, who invaded Iran*. *This Saddam* was different from *the one who eliminated the Kurds*, a common problem for Iran, Iraq and Turkey, in 1987-88, and *the Saddam who recited kalma-e-shahadat at the scaffold* was absolutely different from *the secular Saddam of the Baath Party*.
- c. One of the callers drew a parallel between *the Saddam Hussein of today* and *the Hitler of the 1930's* and contended appeasement is no way to approach the former in light of what occurred with the latter. (from an article published in October 2002)

In (6) a., the *of* phrase designates a long temporal period which stretches from the beginning of Saddam's presidency to the Iran-Iraq War.⁴ This expression, together with the expression *the Saddam of 1968-80*, emphasizes the positive aspects of Saddam Hussein, who, as the context reveals, became a ruthless dictator in later years. Unlike this example, the temporal period designated by the *of* phrase in (6) b. is a single day, the day of Saddam Hussein's death. Additionally, this Saddam is compared with the Saddams referred to by different noun phrases, which are highlighted in the context. The conceptual partition in each of these expressions is achieved by restrictive modification of different types. Such expressions in this context further emphasize the distinctions among the members of a counterfactual class of Saddams. In example (6) c., there are two expressions of the type *the X_{personal name} of Y*, i.e. *the Saddam Hussein of today* and *the Hitler of the 1930's*. In both expressions, the conceptual partition is achieved by the *of* phrases which designate temporal periods. In addition, the Saddam of

⁴ Another expression which contains a figuratively used personal name, *the Atatürk of modern Iraq*, appears in (6) a. The figurative meaning of the personal name in this expression arises in multiple tiers of metonymic and metaphoric mappings. Cf. Brdar and Brdar-Szabó (2007) for the construction of metaphonymic meaning in multiple tiers of metonymic and metaphoric mappings and Berberović (2007) for the types of source and target domains involved in the tier of metaphoric mappings.

the period before the Iraq War is compared with the Hitler of the period before World War II.

As the examples in (6) show, the temporal periods designated by the *of* phrase can range from decades or years to mere days or hours. However, provided that the speaker can isolate features of an individual perceived as sufficiently distinct and connected to a certain life period, whether long or short, the conceptual partition of a unitary entity can occur. Such characteristics may be observed by a majority of speakers, but may also be based on the personal opinion and judgment of a single speaker, as illustrated by the following examples.

As in the Zidane examples in (5), conceptual partition enables the creation of a counterfactual class of distinct individuals along the time axis. However, as the examples in (7) show, the temporal periods isolated and ultimately the characteristics focused upon greatly depend on the speaker's judgment and point of view. Whether *the Zidane of 1998* and *the Zidane of 2006* are perceived as distinct individuals depends not only on encyclopedic knowledge but also on personal judgment. This is even more conspicuous in the following examples concerning George Bush.

- (7) a. But *the George Bush of 2006* seems to be a far cry from *the man I spoke with in 2001*, or *the back-slapping governor who charmed the hell out of me* when I visited him in the Texas governor's mansion in 1999.
- b. Well-known East Bay poet Ishmael Reed recited one of his poems and rejected claims that Bush has been transformed by the Sept. 11 attacks. "*The George Bush of today is the same George Bush of September 10,*" he said.
- c. His most interesting observation, I thought, was about the vast difference between *the George Bush of today* and *the George Bush of 1994*, when he was debating Ann Richards during the Texas gubernatorial race: This Bush was eloquent. He spoke quickly and easily. [...] Obviously, Bush doesn't sound this way as President, and there is no one conclusive explanation for the change.

In example (7) a., apart from the *of* phrase, the conceptual partition of a unitary entity is achieved by another type of restrictive posmodification, namely a relative clause. In this example, the speaker perceives *the George Bush of 2006* as a completely different individual in comparison to *the George Bush of 2001* or *the George Bush of 1999*. This comparison is based on the speaker's encoun-

ters with George Bush in 1999 and 2001. It is obvious that the speaker perceives certain properties, actions, decisions, and behavior characterizing George Bush in one temporal period as being distinct enough from those characterizing him in a different temporal period. This does not mean, however, that such differences will be perceived by all speakers. This is further confirmed by example (7) b. As it can be inferred from the context, it is believed that the September 11 attacks had a great impact on George Bush's political career, and that he is no longer the person he was before the attacks. However, this difference is not acknowledged by the speaker who equates *the George Bush of today* with *the George Bush of September 10*. In (7) c., the speaker distinguishes *the George Bush of 1994* from *the George Bush of today* on the basis of eloquence, contending that his speaking abilities in the two periods are not the same.

Noticeably, the interpretation and use of expressions with partitive restrictive modification depend not only on the knowledge but also on the opinion of the speaker. In the Zidane examples in (5), the characteristics are to some extent objective, being perceived in the same fashion by the majority of the speakers - more precisely, by football fans. However, in examples in (7), the characteristic properties isolated are less objective, being based on the opinions of the speakers and formed under specific circumstances, or focusing on different qualities. It seems that as long as the speaker perceives certain characteristic properties as outstanding and defining, regardless of the standards employed, the conceptual partition can be achieved. Furthermore, the context in which expressions of the type *the X of Y* in examples presented above appear seems very important. Clues in the context point to the properties which the speaker has isolated as defining and distinctive.

Besides qualities and performance, the speaker can also perceive the physical appearance of a person in one life period as distinct from that of another period, thereby allowing for partitive restrictive modification. The examples in (8) show that speakers perceive *the Michael Jackson of today* and *the Michael Jackson of the 80s* as two distinct individuals, based on his physical appearance before and after undergoing numerous plastic surgeries. In all of these examples, the defining properties isolated for the two temporal periods are those pertaining to physical appearance. Furthermore, the humorous expression in the title, *the Michael Jackson of two or three noses ago*, further supports this claim, but also shows that, unlike the common expressions relating to Zidane in (5), expressions with partitive restrictive modification can be created by the speaker on the spur of the moment as nonce construction.

- (8) a. And *the Michael Jackson of today*, the physically transformed, faded King of Pop, who will enter the cramped, nondescript courtroom in a

California farm town Monday morning to face charges of child molestation.

- b. Is it just me, or does the zombie version of Michael Jackson in “Thriller” from 1983 look a lot healthier than *the Michael Jackson of today*?
- c. *The Michael Jackson of the 1980s* is gone, forever replaced by the vision of a man who has had too much plastic surgery and is afraid of the outside world.
- d. I miss *the Michael Jackson of the 80's...* Thriller, one glove, jackets with zippers, still had most of his nose.

However, the expressions *the Michael Jackson of the 80s* and *the Michael Jackson of today* can be used not only for the physical appearance of the person in question but also his musical career, as in (9). In the 1980's, Michael Jackson's career reached its peak; he enjoyed world-wide fame for his dazzling performances and number-one hits. Nowadays he is better known for his controversial personal life and child molestation trials than for his music or performances. These expressions show that the use of the expressions in question relies on the speaker's judgment or what, in speaker's opinion, presents a defining moment in the individual's career. As in (8), the presence of contextual clues reveals which characteristic properties are highlighted. However, this also points out the fact that the contextual clues are crucial in these examples. Otherwise, the interpretation of the expressions would depend on the hearer's knowledge and personal opinion, which could of course yield a meaning contrary to the speaker's intentions.

- (9) a. And *the Michael Jackson of today* is not *the Michael Jackson who at one time was the No. 1 pop star in the world*. His “Thriller” CD topped the charts, while his latest didn't crack the top 10. (2003 interview)
- b. What happened to *the Michael Jackson of the 80s*? The King of Pop. Badass-extraordinaire, whose spicy moves and delicate voice buckled knees of desiring women across the world. According to reviews of his appearance at the World Music Awards in London, Jackson managed only to struggle through a few lines of his performance before being booed off stage by a disappointed audience.

- c. But *the Michael Jackson of the 1980's* died. The man who was accused of child molestation is not the music legend of my youth. They aren't the same person.

Example (10) a. is another conceptual partition along the time axis. In this example, the Shakira who released the album "Laundry Service" in 2002 and the Shakira who released the album "Oral Fixation" in 2005 are perceived as two different individuals. In example (10) b., *that of Laundry Service* is used instead of the expression in (10) a., *the Shakira of 2001*, which refers to the same individual in the counterfactual class of individuals created by conceptual partition. This example, in some respects, resembles example (10) b., in which an event stands for the temporal period. However, in this example, it seems that there are two metonymies at work. Via the first metonymy, the result of the event, i.e. the album, stands for the event of writing or releasing the album. Via the second metonymy, the album stands for the period of time when the album was written or released.

- (10) a. The album leaves a little bit of sadness, though, for people who long for *the Shakira of 2001*. That Shakira is no more, and in order to fully appreciate Oral Fixation Vol. 2 music lovers need to take more than just a first listen.
- b. Then we have *Animal city* and *Timor* throwing in some serious pep and grind. Don't expect a *Whenever wherever* rerun on these two records, for the lady has grown to learn that to get oral and then have them all fixated, you've got to shed your inhibitions and do something different. And that's just the difference between *the Shakira of now* and *that of Laundry Service*. (from an article published in February 2006)

In order to show that (10) b. is not an exception, similar examples are presented in (11) and (12). These examples can be analyzed in the same way as (10) b. In (11), via the same two metonymies as in (10) b., the album "The Eminem Show" stands for 2002 and the album "the Slim Shady" stands for 1999. The same analysis can be applied to the examples in (12). In these examples, by conceptual partition, the Shakespeare who wrote sonnets and the Shakespeare who wrote plays are perceived as two different individuals.

- (11) *The Eminem of "The Eminem Show"* is as just as sour as *the Eminem of "The Slim Shady LP,"* but where he once trucked almost solely in lacerating self-deprecation, he now adds way too much overwrought self-aggrandizement to the mix: every slur he tosses off is a valiant

slur in the name of free speech, and all the silly finger-waggers who chastise him are granted powers they don't

- (12) a. *The Shakespeare of the sonnets* is a very different person from *the playwright who gave us King Lear, The Tempest and A Midsummer Night's Dream*. In the plays he is the consummate craftsman, entertaining audiences with masterpieces of dramatic effect while exploring human character to a degree seen never before or since. The sonnets, though, reveal a more thoughtful, introspective writer, a philosopher-poet inquiring, especially, into the question of Time and its effect on human affairs.
- b. We presume *the Shakespeare of the Sonnets* possibly completed all 154 by the end of the 1590s, but they would have been passed around, in Manuscript form, for years before.

Examples in (10) b., (11), and (12) show that the conceptual partition of a unitary entity along the time axis can be more complex, employing more than one conceptual metonymy. Nevertheless, the ENTITY FOR ACTIVE ZONE metonymy plays a leading role in these examples as well.

4. Conclusion

The paper attempts to demonstrate the construction of the figurative meaning of personal names in expressions of the type *the X_{personal name} of Y*, in which *Y* designates temporal periods. The *of* phrase modification in such expressions can be regarded as an instance of partitive restrictive modification. The effect of this modification is the conceptual partition of a unitary entity along the time axis. In simpler terms, an individual, the bearer of the personal name, is figuratively “cut into pieces”, “each piece” representing a different individual. The leading role in conceptual partition is played by the ENTITY FOR ACTIVE ZONE metonymy, in which the target is a temporal period and the vehicle is a personal name. This metonymy enables a unitary entity, i.e. an individual, to be perceived as a class of individuals.

The temporal periods designated by the *of* phrase can be quite long or relatively short. However, the only condition which must be met is that the person's characteristics are perceived as sufficiently distinct at one point in time to be considered as belonging to a different individual. This holds true if one grants that a person changes physically, mentally, or emotionally, as time passes. However, these changes may not be perceived in the same fashion by all, nor may

they be apparent or accessible to every speaker. Therefore, the use of the expressions in question, to a large extent, depends on the encyclopedic knowledge of the speaker but also his personal opinions and judgment. This being the case, the context, in most cases, provides clues as to which characteristic properties are isolated as distinct and defining in the temporal period in question. Otherwise, without contextual clues, the interpretation may depend on the hearer's encyclopedic knowledge and opinions.

For further research, it would be interesting to consider partitive restrictive modification of personal names by means of postmodifiers other than the *of* phrase. At first blush, it seems that the construction of the figurative meaning in such expressions would be far more complex and not based on a single metonymy only. However, as luck would have it, cognitive linguistics is well equipped to explain the construction of the figurative meaning of personal names in such expressions.

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THE MICHAEL JACKSON OF TWO OR THREE NOSES AGO I
THE MICHAEL JACKSON OF TODAY –
VIŠESTRUKA LIČNOST ILI KONCEPTUALNA METONIMIJA?

Rad se bavi stvaranjem figurativnog značenja vlastitih imena u izrazima tipa *determinator X of Y*, u kojima je *X* vlastito ime, a *Y* označava vremenski period. Smatra se da su takvi izrazi, koji označavaju izvornog nositelja imena, primjeri partitivne restriktivne modifikacije. Primijenjujući dostignuća Barcelone (2003, 2004) i Brdara and Brdar-Szabó (2007) u analizi figurativnog značenja vlastitih imenica, rad pokazuje da je konceptualna metonimija ENTITET UMJESTO AKTIVNE ZONE neophodna da bi se objasnilo nastajanje figurativnog značenja vlastitih imena u ovim izrazima. Kao rezultat partitivne restriktivne modifikacije, izvorni nositelj vlastitog imena je figurativno razdijeljen u različite osobe pomoću konceptualne metonimije ENTITET UMJESTO AKTIVNE ZONE.

Ključne riječi: vlastita imena, figurativno značenje, partitivna restriktivna modifikacija, konceptualna metonimija tipa ENTITET UMJESTO AKTIVNE ZONE.